Yesterday's post began a critique of an article in ScientificAmerican.com, a usually sober and authoritative source . Quoting from the on-line article :
"In 1950, Theodore von Karman, one of the founding fathers of ... aeronautical engineering, published a paper entitled What Price Speed ? Specific Power Required for Propulsion of Vehicles.
[now updated by faculty at Imperial Colleege, London].
von Karman showed that if you take a vehicle's horsepower divided by its weight and speed , yoou can see how efficient that vehicle is compared to other vehicles."
The article goes on to argue, essentially, that the reason for the lack of progress in airship development is due to their comparative inefficiency as transportation.
Well, there's a lot more to that story than the author provides his readers. First, some brief background on the situation :
Dr. Barry Prentice, of the University of Manitoba, is to be strongly commended for his tenacity in pursuing vital North American concerns in the North circumpolar regions. He began his crusade to wake up international interest in the once-forbidding regions that stretch around the North Pole for such an enormous distance north of Canada, through areas which were once considered of no interest because they were so unnavigable, so difficult of traverse, and so seemingly bare of value, of resources, and of people.
BUT, time and paradigm shifts changes all things. Three critical variables shifted :
1. the brutal economic facts of the discovery of priceless mineral resources in that area,
2. the realization of the sudden accessibility of these areas because of the opening of the Northwest Passage attributable to climate change, and
3. the interest of the area as a geo-politically and strategically important region.
Travel requirements and political control exerted their inevitable influences. Suddenly, the Middle East, with its almost Biblical politics and its quasi-monopoly on oil, has begun to diminish in importance. Entrepreneurs in other countries began to dig their giant globes of the Earth --- with their three-dimensional perspectives on trade routes --- out of the executive offices where they had served as room decorations for centuries.
Suddenly, these peculiar-looking vehicles called Airships began to make a great deal of sense. Why?
1. They didn't need roads
2. They didn't need a complex infrastructure like long runways, often impossible to construct in the Northlands
3. They didn't require the huge initial cost --- in the billions --- to construct the spider web of access roads which ground travel appeared to require. Furthermore who would provide or finance them ?
That's a very large dollar figure that is rarely factored into developmental planning or assessment . Remember that mining companies are in the business of locating and extracting minerals, not in the business of building roads.
4. Airplanes --- even great ones like the DeHavilland Beaver ---- have limitations on the size and weight they can carry and require major construction of runways, landing strips, and airports, as well as refueling and repair facilities.
5. Can you say "broken truck axles"?
6. Native settlements, as they increased in complexity, have come to depend on external resources --- even to outboard motor parts for boats used in arctic mammal hunts
Where is the concern for Efficiency now?) .
The people who say, "Ice Roads? Why don't they just travel when they can?" must be living in an ivory tower world. Immediate need and unexpected emergencies constantly intrude into our Real World . It's a world in which, every day, conditions are evolving that force new realities upon development and support in the circumpolar regions, which in turn force the adoption of new modalities on the planners.
The hard-nosed, gimlet-eyed businessmen and investors associated with mining, logging, and natural gas exploration companies ask "What is the best way to do that?" and suddenly find themselves becoming strong supporters of airships to meet arctic heavy lift needs.
These questions must be answered, and sooner rather than later :
1. Who will pay for access roads?
2. Who will fund the initial capital costs?
3. ... with no clear Return On Investment? Who will wait the 10 to 15 years for this ROI ?
4. Who will own and control these part-time highways ?
5. Who will deflect the impatience of the shareholders?
6. Who will determine the priority of appropriating the building costs?
7. Isn't it the truth that the need for investment capital is often inversely proportonal to its availability, often with self-appointed naysayers arguing that it's all unnecessary and inefficient.
When you ask "Why is it taking so long to get flying, viable airships to market?" , please add to all those impedimenta the following major considerations :
1. The very long certification times for new modalities of air travel.
2. The uncertainty of the certification processes and requirements for these unfamiliar airships
3. The lead time to educate pilot operators in an unfamiliar operational process
4. The resistance and mind-sets of legislators and bureaucrats
5. ... and, finally, the opposition of theoreticians concerned with efficiency who can prove mathematically and (in Captain Queeg's memorable phrase) " beyond a shadow of a doubt that the strawberries were stolen".
The clearest determinants for reality checks on aeronautical progress, customer acceptance, and widespread use are not mathematical equations for efficiency, but rather the purchasing practices of the military and paramilitary (police) services. They choose the best tools for the job, test them with infinite care, and back their bet with billions of dollars. For proof, just check the latest airship procurements; you'll find them under "Purchases" in Defense Industry Daily, NOT in 60-year-old theoretical engineering texts.
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